1723 |
to see process information. The content of /proc/ccs/.execute_handler is |
to see process information. The content of /proc/ccs/.execute_handler is |
1724 |
identical to /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
identical to /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
1725 |
|
|
1726 |
Version 1.6.5 2008/11/11 Third anniversary release. |
Version 1.6.5 2008/11/11 Third anniversary release. |
1727 |
|
|
1728 |
Fix 2008/12/01 |
Fix 2008/12/01 |
1729 |
|
|
2243 |
/proc/ccs/profile (which results in not protecting the system at all), |
/proc/ccs/profile (which results in not protecting the system at all), |
2244 |
I added a check for PROFILE_VERSION= . |
I added a check for PROFILE_VERSION= . |
2245 |
|
|
2246 |
Version 1.7.1 2009/11/11 Fourth anniversary release. |
Version 1.7.1 2009/11/11 Fourth anniversary release. |
2247 |
|
|
2248 |
Fix 2009/11/13 |
Fix 2009/11/13 |
2249 |
|
|
2382 |
Since 1.7.0 , ccs_lport_reserved() was by error checking wrong port |
Since 1.7.0 , ccs_lport_reserved() was by error checking wrong port |
2383 |
number. As a result, "deny_autobind" keyword was not working as expected. |
number. As a result, "deny_autobind" keyword was not working as expected. |
2384 |
|
|
2385 |
Version 1.7.2 2010/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
Version 1.7.2 2010/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
2386 |
|
|
2387 |
Fix 2010/04/10 |
Fix 2010/04/10 |
2388 |
|
|
2441 |
permissions (e.g. allow_env PATH if symlink.target="/"), it triggered |
permissions (e.g. allow_env PATH if symlink.target="/"), it triggered |
2442 |
NULL pointer dereference. |
NULL pointer dereference. |
2443 |
|
|
2444 |
Fix 2010/07/21 |
Fix 2010/10/28 |
2445 |
|
|
2446 |
@ Wait for next connection/datagram if current connection/datagram was |
@ Fix umount() pathname calculation. |
|
discarded. |
|
2447 |
|
|
2448 |
I was misunderstanding the discussion of post accept()/recvmsg() hook. |
"mount --bind /path/to/file1 /path/to/file2" is legal. |
2449 |
The kernel is allowed to wait for next connection/datagram unless |
Therefore, "umount /path/to/file2" is also legal. |
2450 |
MSG_DONTWAIT or O_NONBLOCK is set. The kernel is allowed to return |
Do not automatically append trailing '/' if pathname to be unmounted |
2451 |
-EAGAIN if MSG_DONTWAIT or O_NONBLOCK is set. |
does not end with '/'. |
2452 |
The change I made on 2009/05/08 was wrong. |
|
2453 |
|
@ Add preserve KABI compatibility option. (2.6 kernels only) |
2454 |
|
|
2455 |
|
TOMOYO needs "struct ccs_domain_info *" and "u32" for each |
2456 |
|
"struct task_struct". But embedding these variables into |
2457 |
|
"struct task_struct" breaks KABI for prebuilt kernel modules (which |
2458 |
|
means that you will need to rebuild prebuilt kernel modules). |
2459 |
|
|
2460 |
|
Since KABI is commonly used (compared to 5 years ago), asking users to |
2461 |
|
rebuild kernel modules which are not included in kernel package is no |
2462 |
|
longer preferable. Therefore, I added a new option that keeps |
2463 |
|
"struct task_struct" unmodified in order to keep KABI. |
2464 |
|
|
2465 |
|
Note that you have to use ccs-patch-2.6.\*.diff which patches |
2466 |
|
kernel/fork.c in order to use this option. Otherwise, TOMOYO will leak |
2467 |
|
memory whenever "struct task_struct" is released. |
2468 |
|
|
2469 |
|
@ Change directives. |
2470 |
|
|
2471 |
|
I removed "allow_" prefix from directives. New directives for files are |
2472 |
|
prefixed with "file ". For example, "allow_read" changed to "file read", |
2473 |
|
"allow_ioctl" changed to "file ioctl". New directive for "allow_network |
2474 |
|
TCP" is "network inet stream", "allow_network UDP" is "network inet |
2475 |
|
dgram", "allow_network RAW" is "network inet raw". New directive for |
2476 |
|
"allow_env" is "misc env". New directive for "allow_signal" is "ipc |
2477 |
|
signal". New directive for "allow_capability" is "capability". These new |
2478 |
|
directives correspond with keywords used by profile's CONFIG lines. |
2479 |
|
|
2480 |
|
I removed "deny_rewrite" and "allow_rewrite" directives and introduced |
2481 |
|
"file append" directive. Thus, permission for open(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND) |
2482 |
|
changed from "allow_write" + "allow_rewrite" to "file append". |
2483 |
|
|
2484 |
|
I removed "SYS_MOUNT", "SYS_UMOUNT", "SYS_CHROOT", "SYS_KILL", |
2485 |
|
"SYS_LINK", "SYS_SYMLINK", "SYS_RENAME", "SYS_UNLINK", "SYS_CHMOD", |
2486 |
|
"SYS_CHOWN", "SYS_IOCTL", "SYS_PIVOT_ROOT" keywords from capabilities |
2487 |
|
because these permissions can be checked by other directives (e.g. |
2488 |
|
"file mount", "ipc signal"). |
2489 |
|
|
2490 |
|
I also removed "conceal_mount" keyword from capabilities because this |
2491 |
|
check requires hooks in filesystem part while almost all hooks for |
2492 |
|
filesystem part have moved to LSM by Linux 2.6.34. |
2493 |
|
|
2494 |
|
New directive for "execute_handler" is "task auto_execute_handler", |
2495 |
|
"denied_execute_handler" is "task denied_execute_handler". |
2496 |
|
|
2497 |
|
@ Distinguish send() and recv() operations. |
2498 |
|
|
2499 |
|
Until now, it was impossible for UDP and IP sockets to allow either |
2500 |
|
only sending or only receiving because permissions were aggregated with |
2501 |
|
"connect" keyword. I broke "connect" keyword into "send" and "recv" |
2502 |
|
keywords so that you can keep access control for send() operation enabled |
2503 |
|
when you have to disable access control for recv() operation due to |
2504 |
|
application breakage by discarding incoming datagram. |
2505 |
|
|
2506 |
|
@ Add Unix domain socket restriction support. |
2507 |
|
|
2508 |
|
Until now, it was possible to restrict only inet domain sockets (i.e. |
2509 |
|
TCP/UDP/RAW). I added restriction for Unix domain sockets (i.e. stream/ |
2510 |
|
dgram/seqpacket). New directive "network unix" is added as well as |
2511 |
|
"network inet" directive. |
2512 |
|
|
2513 |
|
@ Allow specifying multiple permissions in a line. |
2514 |
|
|
2515 |
|
Until now, only "allow_read/write" can be specified for combination of |
2516 |
|
"allow_read" + "allow_write". Now, you can combine other permissions as |
2517 |
|
long as type of parameters for these permissions is same. For example, |
2518 |
|
"file read/write/append/execute/unlink/truncate /tmp/file" is correct |
2519 |
|
but "file read/write/create /tmp/file" is wrong because "file create" |
2520 |
|
requires create mode whereas "file read" and "file write" do not. |
2521 |
|
|
2522 |
|
@ Allow wildcard for execute permission and domainname. |
2523 |
|
|
2524 |
|
Until now, to execute programs with temporary names, "aggregator" is |
2525 |
|
needed. To simplify code, I modified to accept wildcards for execute |
2526 |
|
permission and domainname. Now, you can directly specify |
2527 |
|
"file execute /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\?" and use |
2528 |
|
"/tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\?" within domainnames. |
2529 |
|
|
2530 |
|
@ Change pathname for non-rename()able filesystems. |
2531 |
|
|
2532 |
|
LSM version of TOMOYO wants to use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/$PID/ if |
2533 |
|
$PID matches current thread's process ID in order to prevent current |
2534 |
|
thread from accessing other process's information unless needed. |
2535 |
|
But since procfs can be mounted on various locations (e.g. /proc/ /proc2/ |
2536 |
|
/p/ /tmp/foo/100/p/ ), LSM version of TOMOYO cannot tell that whether the |
2537 |
|
numeric part in the string returned by __d_path() represents process ID |
2538 |
|
or not. |
2539 |
|
|
2540 |
|
Therefore, to be able to convert from $PID to self no matter where procfs |
2541 |
|
is mounted, I changed pathname representations for filesystems which do |
2542 |
|
not support rename() operation (e.g. proc, sysfs, securityfs). |
2543 |
|
|
2544 |
|
Now, "/proc/self/mounts" changed to "proc:/self/mounts" and |
2545 |
|
"/sys/kernel/security/" changed to "sys:/kernel/security/" and |
2546 |
|
"/dev/pts/0" changed to "devpts:/0". |
2547 |
|
|
2548 |
|
@ Add a new keyword "any" for domain transition control. |
2549 |
|
|
2550 |
|
To be able to make it easier to apply auto_execute_handler on each |
2551 |
|
domain, I added "any" keyword to domain transition control keywords. Now, |
2552 |
|
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd" changed to |
2553 |
|
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd from any" and |
2554 |
|
"keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" changed to |
2555 |
|
"keep_domain any from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash". |
2556 |
|
|
2557 |
|
"keep_domain /path/to/auto_execute_handler from any" will allow you to |
2558 |
|
apply auto_execute_handler for any domains without creating domains for |
2559 |
|
auto_execute_handler. |
2560 |
|
|
2561 |
|
@ Change buffering mode for reading policy. |
2562 |
|
|
2563 |
|
To be able to read() very very long lines correctly, I changed the way |
2564 |
|
TOMOYO buffers policy for reading. |
2565 |
|
|
2566 |
|
@ Introduce "acl_group" keyword. |
2567 |
|
|
2568 |
|
Until now, it was possible to specify only "allow_read" and "allow_env" |
2569 |
|
keywords in the exception policy. |
2570 |
|
|
2571 |
|
Since some operations like "file read/write/append /dev/null" and |
2572 |
|
"network UDP send/recv @DNS_SERVER 53" are very common and should be |
2573 |
|
permitted to all domains, I introduced "acl_group" keyword for giving |
2574 |
|
such permissions. |
2575 |
|
|
2576 |
|
For example, specify "acl_group 0 file read/write/append /dev/null" in |
2577 |
|
the exception policy and specify "use_group 0" from the domains in the |
2578 |
|
domain policy. |
2579 |
|
|
2580 |
|
"ignore_global_allow_read" and "ignore_global_allow_env" directives were |
2581 |
|
removed from domain policy and "use_group" keyword was added. |
2582 |
|
|
2583 |
|
@ Remove "if" and "; set" keyword. |
2584 |
|
|
2585 |
|
I removed need for specifying these keyword. |
2586 |
|
You can simply specify like below. |
2587 |
|
|
2588 |
|
file read /etc/shadow task.uid=0 |
2589 |
|
|
2590 |
|
@ Remove "file_pattern" keyword. |
2591 |
|
|
2592 |
|
I removed "file_pattern" keyword because it is impossible to predefine |
2593 |
|
all possible pathname patterns. Also, learning pathnames using incomplete |
2594 |
|
patterns makes it difficult to later replace using "path_group" keyword. |
2595 |
|
|
2596 |
|
@ Replace verbose= parameter with statistic interface. |
2597 |
|
|
2598 |
|
Since it is noisy if a lot of policy violation messages are printed, |
2599 |
|
I removed printk(). To be able to check whether policy violation occurred |
2600 |
|
or not, I introduced /proc/ccs/stat interface which counts number of |
2601 |
|
policy violations occurred. You can firstly check /proc/ccs/stat and then |
2602 |
|
check /proc/ccs/reject_log . |
2603 |
|
|
2604 |
|
@ Remove global preference. |
2605 |
|
|
2606 |
|
I removed global preference in order to make code simpler. |
2607 |
|
|
2608 |
|
@ Allow controlling generation of access granted logs for per an entry |
2609 |
|
basis. |
2610 |
|
|
2611 |
|
I added per-entry flag which controls generation of grant logs because |
2612 |
|
Xen and KVM issues ioctl requests so frequently. For example, |
2613 |
|
|
2614 |
|
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 grant_log=no |
2615 |
|
|
2616 |
|
will suppress /proc/ccs/grant_log even if preference says grant_log=yes . |
2617 |
|
|
2618 |
|
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 grant_log=yes |
2619 |
|
|
2620 |
|
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log even if preference says grant_log=no . |
2621 |
|
|
2622 |
|
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 |
2623 |
|
|
2624 |
|
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log only if preference says grant_log=yes . |
2625 |
|
|
2626 |
|
This flag is intended for frequently accessed resources like |
2627 |
|
|
2628 |
|
file read /var/www/html/\{\*\}/\*.html grant_log=no |
2629 |
|
|
2630 |
|
. |
2631 |
|
|
2632 |
|
@ Automatically create domain by execve() even if enforcing mode. |
2633 |
|
|
2634 |
|
Until now, new domains are not created if the domain was not defined and |
2635 |
|
current domain is enforcing mode ("CONFIG::file::execute=enforcing"). |
2636 |
|
|
2637 |
|
To be able to restrict shell session without using "keep_domain", |
2638 |
|
I changed to create new domains automatically even if current domain is |
2639 |
|
enforcing mode. |
2640 |
|
|
2641 |
|
@ Replace "task.state" with "auto_domain_transition". |
2642 |
|
|
2643 |
|
task.state is difficult to use. Thus, I replaced task.state with |
2644 |
|
auto_domain_transition which performs domain transition instead of |
2645 |
|
changing current process's state variables. |
2646 |
|
|
2647 |
|
If domain transition failed, current process will be killed by SIGKILL |
2648 |
|
signal. This should not happen in normal circumstances, for you know the |
2649 |
|
domain to transit to and thereby you will define the domain beforehand |
2650 |
|
when you use "auto_domain_transition" keyword. |
2651 |
|
|
2652 |
|
@ Replace "allow_transit" with "task manual_domain_transition". |
2653 |
|
|
2654 |
|
I changed this directive to specify absolute domainname (e.g. |
2655 |
|
"<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd //app=cgi1\040id=10000") rather than virtual |
2656 |
|
pathname (e.g. "//app=cgi1\040id=10000") because you know the domain to |
2657 |
|
transit to and thereby you will define the domain beforehand when you use |
2658 |
|
"task manual_domain_transition" directive. |
2659 |
|
|
2660 |
|
This change allows you to jump to arbitrary domain. |
2661 |
|
|
2662 |
|
Note that this change also reverts "Change /proc/ccs/info/self_domain ." |
2663 |
|
made on 2006/10/24. Now, 'cat < /proc/ccs/info/self_domain' will act like |
2664 |
|
'cat /proc/ccs/info/self_domain'. Programs depending on old assumption |
2665 |
|
need to be updated. |
2666 |
|
|
2667 |
|
@ Add "task auto_domain_transition". |
2668 |
|
|
2669 |
|
This is similar to "task manual_domain_transition", but is automatically |
2670 |
|
applied whenever conditions are met. For example, |
2671 |
|
|
2672 |
|
task auto_domain_transition <kernel> //./non-root task.uid!=0 |
2673 |
|
|
2674 |
|
will automatically jump to "<kernel> //./non-root" domain if current |
2675 |
|
process's UID is not 0 whereas |
2676 |
|
|
2677 |
|
task manual_domain_transition <kernel> //./non-root task.uid!=0 |
2678 |
|
|
2679 |
|
will jump to "<kernel> //./non-root" domain if current process's UID is |
2680 |
|
not 0 and current process wrote "<kernel> //./non-root" to |
2681 |
|
/proc/ccs/self_domain interface. |
2682 |
|
|
2683 |
|
If domain transition failed, current process will be killed by SIGKILL |
2684 |
|
signal. |
2685 |
|
|
2686 |
|
@ Optimize for object's size. |
2687 |
|
|
2688 |
|
I merged similar code in order to reduce object's filesize. |
2689 |
|
|
2690 |
|
Version 1.8.0 2010/11/11 Fifth anniversary release. |
2691 |
|
|
2692 |
|
Fix 2010/12/01 |
2693 |
|
|
2694 |
|
@ Use same interface for audit logs. |
2695 |
|
|
2696 |
|
To be able to perform fine grained filtering by /usr/sbin/ccs-auditd , |
2697 |
|
I merged /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log as |
2698 |
|
/proc/ccs/audit and added granted=yes or granted=no to audit logs. |
2699 |
|
|
2700 |
|
Fix 2010/12/17 |
2701 |
|
|
2702 |
|
@ Split ccs_null_security into ccs_default_security and ccs_oom_security. |
2703 |
|
|
2704 |
|
ccs_null_security is used by preserve KABI compatibility option and is |
2705 |
|
used for providing default values against threads which have not yet |
2706 |
|
allocated memory for their security contexts. |
2707 |
|
|
2708 |
|
If current thread failed to allocate memory for current thread's security |
2709 |
|
context, current thread uses ccs_null_security. Since current thread is |
2710 |
|
allowed to modify current thread's security context, current thread might |
2711 |
|
modify ccs_null_security which should not be modified for any reason. |
2712 |
|
|
2713 |
|
Therefore, I split ccs_null_security into ccs_default_security and |
2714 |
|
ccs_oom_security and use ccs_oom_security when current thread failed to |
2715 |
|
allocate memory for current thread's security context. |
2716 |
|
|
2717 |
|
Threads which do not share ccs_oom_security are not affected by threads |
2718 |
|
which share ccs_oom_security. Threads which share ccs_oom_security will |
2719 |
|
experience temporary inconsistency, but such threads are about to be |
2720 |
|
killed by SIGKILL signal. |
2721 |
|
|
2722 |
|
Fix 2011/01/11 |
2723 |
|
|
2724 |
|
@ Use filesystem name for unnamed devices when vfsmount is missing. |
2725 |
|
|
2726 |
|
"Change pathname for non-rename()able filesystems." changed to use |
2727 |
|
"$fsname:" if the filesystem does not support rename() operation and |
2728 |
|
"dev($major,$minor):" otherwise when vfsmount is missing. But it turned |
2729 |
|
out that it is useless to use "dev($major,$minor):" for unnamed devices |
2730 |
|
(filesystems with $major == 0). Thus, I changed to use "$fsname:" rather |
2731 |
|
than "dev($major,$minor):" for filesystems with $major == 0 when vfsmount |
2732 |
|
is missing. |
2733 |
|
|
2734 |
|
Fix 2011/02/07 |
2735 |
|
|
2736 |
|
@ Fix infinite loop bug when reading /proc/ccs/audit or /proc/ccs/query . |
2737 |
|
|
2738 |
|
In ccs_flush(), head->r.w[0] holds pointer to string data to be printed. |
2739 |
|
But head->r.w[0] was updated only when the string data was partially |
2740 |
|
printed (because head->r.w[0] will be updated by head->r.w[1] later if |
2741 |
|
completely printed). However, regarding /proc/ccs/audit and |
2742 |
|
/proc/ccs/query , an additional '\0' is printed after the string data was |
2743 |
|
completely printed. But if free space for read buffer became 0 before |
2744 |
|
printing the additional '\0', ccs_flush() was returning without updating |
2745 |
|
head->r.w[0]. As a result, ccs_flush() forever reprints already printed |
2746 |
|
string data. |
2747 |
|
|
2748 |
|
Fix 2011/03/01 |
2749 |
|
|
2750 |
|
@ Run garbage collector without waiting for /proc/ccs/ users. |
2751 |
|
|
2752 |
|
Currently TOMOYO holds SRCU lock upon open() and releases it upon close() |
2753 |
|
because list elements stored in the "struct ccs_io_buffer" instances are |
2754 |
|
accessed until close() is called. However, such SRCU usage causes lockdep |
2755 |
|
to complain about leaving the kernel with SRCU lock held. Therefore, |
2756 |
|
I changed to hold/release SRCU upon each read()/write() by selectively |
2757 |
|
deferring kfree() by keeping track of the "struct ccs_io_buffer" |
2758 |
|
instances. |
2759 |
|
|
2760 |
|
Fix 2011/03/05 |
2761 |
|
|
2762 |
|
@ Support built-in policy configuration. |
2763 |
|
|
2764 |
|
To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot |
2765 |
|
sequence, I added support for built-in policy configuration and |
2766 |
|
activating access control without calling external policy loader program. |
2767 |
|
|
2768 |
|
This will be useful for systems where operations which can lead to the |
2769 |
|
hijacking of the boot sequence are needed before loading the policy. |
2770 |
|
For example, you can activate immediately after loading the fixed part of |
2771 |
|
policy which will allow only operations needed for mounting a partition |
2772 |
|
which contains the variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG |
2773 |
|
check) and loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using |
2774 |
|
enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of |
2775 |
|
hijacking the boot sequence. |