1723 |
to see process information. The content of /proc/ccs/.execute_handler is |
to see process information. The content of /proc/ccs/.execute_handler is |
1724 |
identical to /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
identical to /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
1725 |
|
|
1726 |
Version 1.6.5 2008/11/11 Third anniversary release. |
Version 1.6.5 2008/11/11 Third anniversary release. |
1727 |
|
|
1728 |
Fix 2008/12/01 |
Fix 2008/12/01 |
1729 |
|
|
2243 |
/proc/ccs/profile (which results in not protecting the system at all), |
/proc/ccs/profile (which results in not protecting the system at all), |
2244 |
I added a check for PROFILE_VERSION= . |
I added a check for PROFILE_VERSION= . |
2245 |
|
|
2246 |
Version 1.7.1 2009/11/11 Fourth anniversary release. |
Version 1.7.1 2009/11/11 Fourth anniversary release. |
2247 |
|
|
2248 |
Fix 2009/11/13 |
Fix 2009/11/13 |
2249 |
|
|
2382 |
Since 1.7.0 , ccs_lport_reserved() was by error checking wrong port |
Since 1.7.0 , ccs_lport_reserved() was by error checking wrong port |
2383 |
number. As a result, "deny_autobind" keyword was not working as expected. |
number. As a result, "deny_autobind" keyword was not working as expected. |
2384 |
|
|
2385 |
Version 1.7.2 2010/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
Version 1.7.2 2010/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
2386 |
|
|
2387 |
Fix 2010/04/10 |
Fix 2010/04/10 |
2388 |
|
|
2441 |
permissions (e.g. allow_env PATH if symlink.target="/"), it triggered |
permissions (e.g. allow_env PATH if symlink.target="/"), it triggered |
2442 |
NULL pointer dereference. |
NULL pointer dereference. |
2443 |
|
|
2444 |
Fix 2010/07/29 |
Fix 2010/10/28 |
2445 |
|
|
2446 |
@ Change keyword syntax. |
@ Fix umount() pathname calculation. |
2447 |
|
|
2448 |
|
"mount --bind /path/to/file1 /path/to/file2" is legal. |
2449 |
|
Therefore, "umount /path/to/file2" is also legal. |
2450 |
|
Do not automatically append trailing '/' if pathname to be unmounted |
2451 |
|
does not end with '/'. |
2452 |
|
|
2453 |
|
@ Add preserve KABI compatibility option. (2.6 kernels only) |
2454 |
|
|
2455 |
|
TOMOYO needs "struct ccs_domain_info *" and "u32" for each |
2456 |
|
"struct task_struct". But embedding these variables into |
2457 |
|
"struct task_struct" breaks KABI for prebuilt kernel modules (which |
2458 |
|
means that you will need to rebuild prebuilt kernel modules). |
2459 |
|
|
2460 |
|
Since KABI is commonly used (compared to 5 years ago), asking users to |
2461 |
|
rebuild kernel modules which are not included in kernel package is no |
2462 |
|
longer preferable. Therefore, I added a new option that keeps |
2463 |
|
"struct task_struct" unmodified in order to keep KABI. |
2464 |
|
|
2465 |
|
Note that you have to use ccs-patch-2.6.\*.diff which patches |
2466 |
|
kernel/fork.c in order to use this option. Otherwise, TOMOYO will leak |
2467 |
|
memory whenever "struct task_struct" is released. |
2468 |
|
|
2469 |
|
@ Change directives. |
2470 |
|
|
2471 |
I removed "allow_" prefix from directives. New directives for files are |
I removed "allow_" prefix from directives. New directives for files are |
2472 |
prefixed with "file ". For example, "allow_read" changed to "file read", |
prefixed with "file ". For example, "allow_read" changed to "file read", |
2473 |
"allow_ioctl" changed to "file ioctl". New directive for "allow_network" |
"allow_ioctl" changed to "file ioctl". New directive for "allow_network |
2474 |
is "network". New directive for "allow_env" is "misc env". New directive |
TCP" is "network inet stream", "allow_network UDP" is "network inet |
2475 |
for "allow_signal" is "ipc signal". New directive for "allow_capability" |
dgram", "allow_network RAW" is "network inet raw". New directive for |
2476 |
is "capability". These directives correspond with keywords used by |
"allow_env" is "misc env". New directive for "allow_signal" is "ipc |
2477 |
profile's CONFIG lines. |
signal". New directive for "allow_capability" is "capability". These new |
2478 |
|
directives correspond with keywords used by profile's CONFIG lines. |
2479 |
|
|
2480 |
I removed "deny_rewrite" and "allow_rewrite" directives and introduced |
I removed "deny_rewrite" and "allow_rewrite" directives and introduced |
2481 |
"file append" directive. Thus, permission for open(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND) |
"file append" directive. Thus, permission for open(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND) |
2491 |
check requires hooks in filesystem part while almost all hooks for |
check requires hooks in filesystem part while almost all hooks for |
2492 |
filesystem part have moved to LSM by Linux 2.6.34. |
filesystem part have moved to LSM by Linux 2.6.34. |
2493 |
|
|
2494 |
@ Distinguish send() and recv() operations for UDP and IP protocols. |
New directive for "execute_handler" is "task auto_execute_handler", |
2495 |
|
"denied_execute_handler" is "task denied_execute_handler". |
2496 |
|
|
2497 |
|
@ Distinguish send() and recv() operations. |
2498 |
|
|
2499 |
Until now, it was impossible for UDP and IP protocols to allow either |
Until now, it was impossible for UDP and IP sockets to allow either |
2500 |
only sending or only receiving because permissions were aggregated with |
only sending or only receiving because permissions were aggregated with |
2501 |
"connect" keyword. I broke "connect" keyword into "send" and "recv" |
"connect" keyword. I broke "connect" keyword into "send" and "recv" |
2502 |
keywords so that you can keep access control for send() operation enabled |
keywords so that you can keep access control for send() operation enabled |
2503 |
when you have to turn access control for recv() operation off due to |
when you have to disable access control for recv() operation due to |
2504 |
application breakage by filtering incoming datagram. |
application breakage by discarding incoming datagram. |
2505 |
|
|
2506 |
@ Wait for next connection/datagram if current connection/datagram was |
@ Add Unix domain socket restriction support. |
|
discarded. |
|
2507 |
|
|
2508 |
Regarding "network TCP accept", "network UDP recv", "network RAW recv" |
Until now, it was possible to restrict only inet domain sockets (i.e. |
2509 |
keywords, I modified to wait for next connection/datagram if current |
TCP/UDP/RAW). I added restriction for Unix domain sockets (i.e. stream/ |
2510 |
connection/datagram was discarded. LSM hooks for these keywords are |
dgram/seqpacket). New directive "network unix" is added as well as |
2511 |
currently missing because this behavior may break applications. |
"network inet" directive. |
|
If you found applications broken by this behavior, you can set |
|
|
CONFIG::network::inet_tcp_accept and/or CONFIG::network::inet_udp_recv |
|
|
and/or CONFIG::network::inet_raw_recv to mode=disabled in order to |
|
|
disable filtering for incoming connection/datagram. |
|
2512 |
|
|
2513 |
@ Allow specifying multiple permissions in a line. |
@ Allow specifying multiple permissions in a line. |
2514 |
|
|
2547 |
|
|
2548 |
@ Add a new keyword "any" for domain transition control. |
@ Add a new keyword "any" for domain transition control. |
2549 |
|
|
2550 |
To be able to make it easier to apply execute_handler on each domain, |
To be able to make it easier to apply auto_execute_handler on each |
2551 |
I added "any" keyword to domain transition control keywords. Now, |
domain, I added "any" keyword to domain transition control keywords. Now, |
2552 |
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd" changed to |
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd" changed to |
2553 |
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd from any" and |
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd from any" and |
2554 |
"keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" changed to |
"keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" changed to |
2555 |
"keep_domain any from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash". |
"keep_domain any from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash". |
2556 |
|
|
2557 |
"keep_domain /path/to/execute_handler from any" will allow you to apply |
"keep_domain /path/to/auto_execute_handler from any" will allow you to |
2558 |
execute_handler for any domains without creating domains for |
apply auto_execute_handler for any domains without creating domains for |
2559 |
execute_handler. |
auto_execute_handler. |
2560 |
|
|
2561 |
@ Change buffering mode for reading policy. |
@ Change buffering mode for reading policy. |
2562 |
|
|
2577 |
the exception policy and specify "use_group 0" from the domains in the |
the exception policy and specify "use_group 0" from the domains in the |
2578 |
domain policy. |
domain policy. |
2579 |
|
|
2580 |
"ignore_global_allow_read" and "ignore_global_allow_env" keywords were |
"ignore_global_allow_read" and "ignore_global_allow_env" directives were |
2581 |
removed from domain policy and "use_group" keyword was added. |
removed from domain policy and "use_group" keyword was added. |
2582 |
|
|
2583 |
|
@ Remove "if" and "; set" keyword. |
2584 |
|
|
2585 |
|
I removed need for specifying these keyword. |
2586 |
|
You can simply specify like below. |
2587 |
|
|
2588 |
|
file read /etc/shadow task.uid=0 |
2589 |
|
|
2590 |
|
@ Remove "file_pattern" keyword. |
2591 |
|
|
2592 |
|
I removed "file_pattern" keyword because it is impossible to predefine |
2593 |
|
all possible pathname patterns. Also, learning pathnames using incomplete |
2594 |
|
patterns makes it difficult to later replace using "path_group" keyword. |
2595 |
|
|
2596 |
|
@ Replace verbose= parameter with statistic interface. |
2597 |
|
|
2598 |
|
Since it is noisy if a lot of policy violation messages are printed, |
2599 |
|
I removed printk(). To be able to check whether policy violation occurred |
2600 |
|
or not, I introduced /proc/ccs/stat interface which counts number of |
2601 |
|
policy violations occurred. You can firstly check /proc/ccs/stat and then |
2602 |
|
check /proc/ccs/reject_log . |
2603 |
|
|
2604 |
|
@ Remove global preference. |
2605 |
|
|
2606 |
|
I removed global preference in order to make code simpler. |
2607 |
|
|
2608 |
@ Allow controlling generation of access granted logs for per an entry |
@ Allow controlling generation of access granted logs for per an entry |
2609 |
basis. |
basis. |
2610 |
|
|
2611 |
I added per-entry flag which controls generation of grant logs because |
I added per-entry flag which controls generation of grant logs because |
2612 |
Xen and KVM issues ioctl requests so frequently. For example, |
Xen and KVM issues ioctl requests so frequently. For example, |
2613 |
|
|
2614 |
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 ; set audit=no |
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 grant_log=no |
2615 |
|
|
2616 |
will suppress /proc/ccs/grant_log even if profile says grant_log=yes . |
will suppress /proc/ccs/grant_log even if preference says grant_log=yes . |
2617 |
|
|
2618 |
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 ; set audit=yes |
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 grant_log=yes |
2619 |
|
|
2620 |
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log even if profile says grant_log=no . |
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log even if preference says grant_log=no . |
2621 |
|
|
2622 |
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 |
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 |
2623 |
|
|
2624 |
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log only if profile says grant_log=yes . |
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log only if preference says grant_log=yes . |
2625 |
|
|
2626 |
This flag is intended for frequently accessed resources like |
This flag is intended for frequently accessed resources like |
2627 |
|
|
2628 |
file read /var/www/html/\{\*\}/\*.html ; set audit=no |
file read /var/www/html/\{\*\}/\*.html grant_log=no |
2629 |
|
|
2630 |
. |
. |
2631 |
|
|
2632 |
|
@ Automatically create domain by execve() even if enforcing mode. |
2633 |
|
|
2634 |
|
Until now, new domains are not created if the domain was not defined and |
2635 |
|
current domain is enforcing mode ("CONFIG::file::execute=enforcing"). |
2636 |
|
|
2637 |
|
To be able to restrict shell session without using "keep_domain", |
2638 |
|
I changed to create new domains automatically even if current domain is |
2639 |
|
enforcing mode. |
2640 |
|
|
2641 |
|
@ Replace "task.state" with "auto_domain_transition". |
2642 |
|
|
2643 |
|
task.state is difficult to use. Thus, I replaced task.state with |
2644 |
|
auto_domain_transition which performs domain transition instead of |
2645 |
|
changing current process's state variables. |
2646 |
|
|
2647 |
|
If domain transition failed, current process will be killed by SIGKILL |
2648 |
|
signal. This should not happen in normal circumstances, for you know the |
2649 |
|
domain to transit to and thereby you will define the domain beforehand |
2650 |
|
when you use "auto_domain_transition" keyword. |
2651 |
|
|
2652 |
|
@ Replace "allow_transit" with "task manual_domain_transition". |
2653 |
|
|
2654 |
|
I changed this directive to specify absolute domainname (e.g. |
2655 |
|
"<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd //app=cgi1\040id=10000") rather than virtual |
2656 |
|
pathname (e.g. "//app=cgi1\040id=10000") because you know the domain to |
2657 |
|
transit to and thereby you will define the domain beforehand when you use |
2658 |
|
"task manual_domain_transition" directive. |
2659 |
|
|
2660 |
|
This change allows you to jump to arbitrary domain. |
2661 |
|
|
2662 |
|
Note that this change also reverts "Change /proc/ccs/info/self_domain ." |
2663 |
|
made on 2006/10/24. Now, 'cat < /proc/ccs/info/self_domain' will act like |
2664 |
|
'cat /proc/ccs/info/self_domain'. Programs depending on old assumption |
2665 |
|
need to be updated. |
2666 |
|
|
2667 |
|
@ Add "task auto_domain_transition". |
2668 |
|
|
2669 |
|
This is similar to "task manual_domain_transition", but is automatically |
2670 |
|
applied whenever conditions are met. For example, |
2671 |
|
|
2672 |
|
task auto_domain_transition <kernel> //./non-root task.uid!=0 |
2673 |
|
|
2674 |
|
will automatically jump to "<kernel> //./non-root" domain if current |
2675 |
|
process's UID is not 0 whereas |
2676 |
|
|
2677 |
|
task manual_domain_transition <kernel> //./non-root task.uid!=0 |
2678 |
|
|
2679 |
|
will jump to "<kernel> //./non-root" domain if current process's UID is |
2680 |
|
not 0 and current process wrote "<kernel> //./non-root" to |
2681 |
|
/proc/ccs/self_domain interface. |
2682 |
|
|
2683 |
|
If domain transition failed, current process will be killed by SIGKILL |
2684 |
|
signal. |
2685 |
|
|
2686 |
@ Optimize for object's size. |
@ Optimize for object's size. |
2687 |
|
|
2688 |
I merged similar code in order to reduce object's filesize. |
I merged similar code in order to reduce object's filesize. |
2689 |
|
|
2690 |
|
Version 1.8.0 2010/11/11 Fifth anniversary release. |
2691 |
|
|
2692 |
|
Fix 2010/12/01 |
2693 |
|
|
2694 |
|
@ Use same interface for audit logs. |
2695 |
|
|
2696 |
|
To be able to perform fine grained filtering by /usr/sbin/ccs-auditd , |
2697 |
|
I merged /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log as |
2698 |
|
/proc/ccs/audit and added granted=yes or granted=no to audit logs. |
2699 |
|
|
2700 |
|
Fix 2010/12/17 |
2701 |
|
|
2702 |
|
@ Split ccs_null_security into ccs_default_security and ccs_oom_security. |
2703 |
|
|
2704 |
|
ccs_null_security is used by preserve KABI compatibility option and is |
2705 |
|
used for providing default values against threads which have not yet |
2706 |
|
allocated memory for their security contexts. |
2707 |
|
|
2708 |
|
If current thread failed to allocate memory for current thread's security |
2709 |
|
context, current thread uses ccs_null_security. Since current thread is |
2710 |
|
allowed to modify current thread's security context, current thread might |
2711 |
|
modify ccs_null_security which should not be modified for any reason. |
2712 |
|
|
2713 |
|
Therefore, I split ccs_null_security into ccs_default_security and |
2714 |
|
ccs_oom_security and use ccs_oom_security when current thread failed to |
2715 |
|
allocate memory for current thread's security context. |
2716 |
|
|
2717 |
|
Threads which do not share ccs_oom_security are not affected by threads |
2718 |
|
which share ccs_oom_security. Threads which share ccs_oom_security will |
2719 |
|
experience temporary inconsistency, but such threads are about to be |
2720 |
|
killed by SIGKILL signal. |
2721 |
|
|
2722 |
|
Fix 2011/01/11 |
2723 |
|
|
2724 |
|
@ Use filesystem name for unnamed devices when vfsmount is missing. |
2725 |
|
|
2726 |
|
"Change pathname for non-rename()able filesystems." changed to use |
2727 |
|
"$fsname:" if the filesystem does not support rename() operation and |
2728 |
|
"dev($major,$minor):" otherwise when vfsmount is missing. But it turned |
2729 |
|
out that it is useless to use "dev($major,$minor):" for unnamed devices |
2730 |
|
(filesystems with $major == 0). Thus, I changed to use "$fsname:" rather |
2731 |
|
than "dev($major,$minor):" for filesystems with $major == 0 when vfsmount |
2732 |
|
is missing. |
2733 |
|
|
2734 |
|
Fix 2011/02/07 |
2735 |
|
|
2736 |
|
@ Fix infinite loop bug when reading /proc/ccs/audit or /proc/ccs/query . |
2737 |
|
|
2738 |
|
In ccs_flush(), head->r.w[0] holds pointer to string data to be printed. |
2739 |
|
But head->r.w[0] was updated only when the string data was partially |
2740 |
|
printed (because head->r.w[0] will be updated by head->r.w[1] later if |
2741 |
|
completely printed). However, regarding /proc/ccs/audit and |
2742 |
|
/proc/ccs/query , an additional '\0' is printed after the string data was |
2743 |
|
completely printed. But if free space for read buffer became 0 before |
2744 |
|
printing the additional '\0', ccs_flush() was returning without updating |
2745 |
|
head->r.w[0]. As a result, ccs_flush() forever reprints already printed |
2746 |
|
string data. |
2747 |
|
|
2748 |
|
Fix 2011/03/01 |
2749 |
|
|
2750 |
|
@ Run garbage collector without waiting for /proc/ccs/ users. |
2751 |
|
|
2752 |
|
Currently TOMOYO holds SRCU lock upon open() and releases it upon close() |
2753 |
|
because list elements stored in the "struct ccs_io_buffer" instances are |
2754 |
|
accessed until close() is called. However, such SRCU usage causes lockdep |
2755 |
|
to complain about leaving the kernel with SRCU lock held. Therefore, |
2756 |
|
I changed to hold/release SRCU upon each read()/write() by selectively |
2757 |
|
deferring kfree() by keeping track of the "struct ccs_io_buffer" |
2758 |
|
instances. |
2759 |
|
|
2760 |
|
Fix 2011/03/05 |
2761 |
|
|
2762 |
|
@ Support built-in policy configuration. |
2763 |
|
|
2764 |
|
To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot |
2765 |
|
sequence, I added support for built-in policy configuration and |
2766 |
|
activating access control without calling external policy loader program. |
2767 |
|
|
2768 |
|
This will be useful for systems where operations which can lead to the |
2769 |
|
hijacking of the boot sequence are needed before loading the policy. |
2770 |
|
For example, you can activate immediately after loading the fixed part of |
2771 |
|
policy which will allow only operations needed for mounting a partition |
2772 |
|
which contains the variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG |
2773 |
|
check) and loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using |
2774 |
|
enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of |
2775 |
|
hijacking the boot sequence. |
2776 |
|
|
2777 |
|
Fix 2011/03/10 |
2778 |
|
|
2779 |
|
@ Remove /proc/ccs/meminfo interface. |
2780 |
|
|
2781 |
|
Please use /proc/ccs/stat interface instead. |
2782 |
|
|
2783 |
|
Fix 2011/03/15 |
2784 |
|
|
2785 |
|
@ Pack policy when printing via /proc/ccs/ interface. |
2786 |
|
|
2787 |
|
The kernel side is ready for accepting packed input like |
2788 |
|
|
2789 |
|
file read/write/execute /path/to/file |
2790 |
|
|
2791 |
|
but was using unpacked output like |
2792 |
|
|
2793 |
|
file read /path/to/file |
2794 |
|
file write /path/to/file |
2795 |
|
file execute /path/to/file |
2796 |
|
|
2797 |
|
because most of userland tools were not ready for accepting packed input. |
2798 |
|
|
2799 |
|
The advantages of using packed policy are that it makes policy files |
2800 |
|
smaller and it speeds up loading/saving policy files. |
2801 |
|
|
2802 |
|
Since most of userland tools are ready for accepting packed input by now, |
2803 |
|
I changed to use packed policy for both input and output. |
2804 |
|
|
2805 |
|
Fix 2011/03/31 |
2806 |
|
|
2807 |
|
@ Fix conditional policy parsing. |
2808 |
|
|
2809 |
|
Since exec.realpath= and symlink.target= accept path_group, |
2810 |
|
symlink.target="@foo" was by error parsed as symlink.target=@foo . |
2811 |
|
|
2812 |
|
@ Serialize updating profile's comment line. |
2813 |
|
|
2814 |
|
We need to serialize when updating COMMENT= line in /proc/ccs/profile . |