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Notes for TOMOYO Linux project |
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|
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This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels. |
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This patch is released under the GPL. |
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|
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Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ |
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|
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The authors of this patch (hereafter, we) don't have much experience |
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in kernel programming. We are worried that this patch would contain |
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some mistakes such as missing hooks, improper location of hooks, |
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potential deadlocks. There would be better way of implementation. |
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All kinds of comments, pointing the errors and suggestions are welcome. |
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|
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We do hope this patch reduces the labor of server security management |
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and you enjoy the life with Linux. |
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|
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This project was very inspired by the comic "Card Captor SAKURA", |
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one of the CLAMP's masterworks. |
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The names SAKURA and TOMOYO and SYAORAN were borrowed from the comic |
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with the heartfelt thanks to CLAMP. |
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|
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|
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|
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ChangeLog: |
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|
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Version 1.0 2005/11/11 First release. |
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|
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Fix 2005/11/18 |
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|
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@ Add setattr() missing hook in SYAORAN fs. |
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|
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setattr() checking for special inode was missing. |
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|
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Fix 2005/11/25 |
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|
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@ Allow initrd.img include /sbin/init . |
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|
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Since version 1.0 loads policy when /sbin/init is called |
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for the first time, initrd.img without the policy directory |
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mustn't start /sbin/init . This forced users not to use |
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initrd.img that includes /sbin/init . |
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I modified to delay loading policy if the policy directory |
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doesn't exist and wait for /sbin/init being called again. |
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|
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Fix 2005/12/02 |
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|
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@ Use lookup_one_len() instead of lookup_hash(). |
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|
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Kernel 2.6.15 changed parameters for lookup_hash(). |
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I modified to use lookup_one_len() to keep compatibility. |
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|
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Fix 2005/12/06 |
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|
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@ Add S_ISDIR() check in SYAORAN fs. |
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|
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Malicious configuration file that attempts to create an inode |
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under non-directory inode caused segmentation fault. |
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|
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Version 1.0.1 2005/12/08 Minor update release. |
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|
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Fix 2006/01/04 |
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|
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@ Add CheckWritePermission() check in unix_bind(). |
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|
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I modified to check write permission in unix_bind(), for |
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sys_mknod(S_IFSOCK) checks write permission. |
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|
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@ Show hook version in proc_misc_init(). |
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|
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The hook part of this patch depends on the kernel's version, |
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while the rest part of this patch doesn't. |
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I added the hook version so that the administrator can |
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know the last modified date of the hooks. |
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|
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@ Move permission checks from filp_open() to open_namei(). |
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|
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I moved the location of checking MAC's permission |
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from filp_open() to open_namei(). |
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|
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@ Fix an error in filp_open(). (only 2.6.15-rc5) |
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|
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This error was only in the patch 2.6.15-rc5 and |
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was fixed in the patch for 2.6.15. |
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|
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Fix 2006/01/12 |
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|
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@ Add /proc/ccs/info/self_domain. |
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|
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I added /proc/ccs/info/self_domain so that the userland programs |
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can know the name of domain they belong to if necessary. |
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|
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Fix 2006/01/13 |
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|
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@ Merge constants for CheckTaskCapability(). |
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|
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I merged *_INHERITABLE_* and *_LOCAL_* to avoid always |
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calling CheckTaskCapability() with both constants. |
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|
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@ DropTaskCapability() returns -EAGAIN on success. |
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|
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DropTaskCapability() must not return 0 on success, for |
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DropTaskCapability() is called from do_execve(). |
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|
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@ Fix an error for chroot() permission check. |
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|
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The chroot() restriction was not working due to the following mistake. |
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CheckChRootPermission() || CheckTaskCapability() returns 0 or 1, while |
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CheckChRootPermission() | CheckTaskCapability() returns 0 or -EPERM. |
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|
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Fix 2006/01/17 |
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|
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@ Suppress some of debug messages in TOMOYO. |
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|
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I added KERN_DEBUG to suppress some of debug messages. |
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|
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Fix 2006/01/19 |
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|
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@ Remove isRoot() checks in AddChrootACL() and AddMountACL(). |
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|
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I found a program that needs to chroot by non-root. |
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So, I stopped checking uid=euid=0 for these functions so that |
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"accept mode" can append ACLs. |
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The isRoot() is checked at AddChrootPolicy() and AddMountPolicy(). |
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|
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@ Map NULL device name to "<NULL>" in AddMountACL(). |
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|
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VMware mounts vmware-hgfs with NULL device name. |
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So I mapped NULL device name to "<NULL>". |
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|
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Fix 2006/01/20 |
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|
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@ Suppress some of debug messages in SAKURA. |
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|
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I added KERN_DEBUG to suppress some of debug messages. |
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|
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@ Call panic() if failed to load given profile. |
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|
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Call panic() if profile index was given via CCS= parameter |
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but the profile doesn't exist. |
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If CCS= parameter is not given, the kernel attempts to load |
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profile 0, but it doesn't call panic() if profile 0 doesn't exist. |
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|
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Fix 2006/01/24 |
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|
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@ Use full_name_hash() for IsGloballyReadableFile(). |
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|
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I modified to use full_name_hash() for faster scan. |
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|
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@ Add signal checking condition in CheckSignalACL(). |
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|
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The documentation says "if the target domain's domainname |
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starts with the source domain's domainname, it is always granted" |
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but actually it isn't. I'll change the documentation instead of |
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changing the source code. |
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|
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Also, checking for pid = -1 was missing. This error was fixed. |
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|
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Fix 2006/02/09 |
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|
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@ Use mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock instead of down()/up(). |
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|
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Kernel 2.6.16 changed members of "struct inode". |
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I modified to use mutex_lock()/mutex_unlock() for after 2.6.16 |
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and down()/up() for before 2.6.16. |
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|
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Version 1.0.2 2006/02/14 Many bug-fixes release. |
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|
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Fix 2006/02/21 |
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|
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@ Divide generic-write permission into individual write permissions. |
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|
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Write permission was divided into the following permissions. |
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|
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'mkdir' for creating directory. |
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'rmdir' for deleting directory. |
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'create' for creating regular file. |
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'unlink' for deleting non-directory. |
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'mksock' for creating UNIX domain socket. |
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'mkfifo' for creating FIFO. |
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'mkchar' for creating character device. |
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'mkblock' for creating block device. |
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'link' for creating hard link. |
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'symlink' for creating symbolic link. |
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'rename' for renaming directory or non-directory. |
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'truncate' for truncating regular file. |
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|
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The permission check for opening files is done using |
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conventional read/write/execute permission. |
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|
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@ Add /proc/ccs/info/mapping. |
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|
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I added /proc/ccs/info/mapping so that the userland programs |
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can know the mapping of individual write permissions. |
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|
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Fix 2006/02/27 |
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|
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@ Fix handling of trailing '\*' in PathMatchesToPattern(). |
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|
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PathMatchesToPattern("/tmp/", "/tmp/\*") returned true |
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because "\*" matches to "more than or equals to 0 character |
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until '/' or end". But since this is a comparison between |
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directory and non-directory, this should not match. |
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|
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This behavior causes the following security risks. |
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In enforce mode, allowing "2 /tmp/\*" grants |
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"mkdir /tmp/" and "rmdir /tmp/" which should be |
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granted only when "2 /tmp/" is allowed. |
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In accept mode, "mkdir /tmp/" or "rmdir /tmp/" appends |
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"2 /tmp/\*" into the domain policy if "file_pattern /tmp/\*" |
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is in the exception policy. |
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|
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I changed not to ignore trailing '\*' in the pattern |
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if pathname ends with '/'. |
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|
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Fix 2006/03/01 |
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|
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@ Add missing spinlock in GetAbsolutePath(). |
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|
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vfsmount_lock was missing. |
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|
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Fix 2006/03/08 |
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|
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@ Add support for "shared subtree" mount operations. |
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|
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Kernel 2.6.15 introduced "shared subtree" functionality. |
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But CheckMountPermission() couldn't recognize flags for |
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do_change_type(). |
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|
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@ Add support for more mount flags. |
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|
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atime/noatime, diratime/nodiratime, recurse/norecurse flags |
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are supported. |
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|
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Fix 2006/03/20 |
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|
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@ Check port numbers for only AF_INET/AF_INET6. |
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|
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CheckBindEntry() and CheckConnectEntry() should check port numbers |
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only when the given address family is either AF_INET or AF_INET6, |
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for address family such as AF_UNSPEC could be passed to bind() |
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and connect() for PF_INET/PF_INET6 sockets. |
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|
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Fix 2006/03/27 |
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|
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@ Use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/\$/ for current process. |
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|
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GetAbsolutePath() now uses "self" instead of pid |
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if current process refers to information related to itself. |
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This exception violates the rule "TOMOYO Linux's pathnames don't |
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contain symbolic links before the last '/'", but I think it worth |
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to do so. The following are the merits gained by this exception. |
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|
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Prevent administrators from granting redundant permissions |
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when a process needs to refer to only current process's information. |
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|
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Allow administrators make current process's information always |
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readable using 'allow_read' directive. |
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|
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Version 1.1 2006/04/01 Functionality enhancement release. |
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|
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Fix 2006/04/03 |
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|
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@ Use queue instead of fixed sized array for audit log. |
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|
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WriteAuditLog() now uses queue to save statically allocated memory. |
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Administrators can give any size for audit logs at runtime. |
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|
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@ Use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() + memset(). |
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|
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kmalloc() + memset() were replaced with kzalloc(). |
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|
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Fix 2006/04/04 |
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|
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@ Support "delayed enforcing" mode. |
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|
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Until now, access request was immediately rejected |
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if policy doesn't allow that access and the system is |
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running in enforce mode. |
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Sometimes, especially after updating softwares, |
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some unexpected access requests arise from proper procedure. |
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Such access requests should be granted because |
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they are not caused by malicious attacks. |
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So I introduced a mechanism to allow administrator some grace |
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to decide to grant or reject such access requests. |
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This mechanism is implemented in the following manner. |
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"Don't return immediately if permission denied." |
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"Sleep for a while waiting administrator's decision." |
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"Return successfully if administrator tells to do so." |
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|
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Fix 2006/04/12 |
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|
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@ Fix handling of prefix in GetAbsolutePath(). |
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|
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Some objects doesn't have prefix "/". |
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Pipe has prefix "pipe:" and socket has prefix "socket:". |
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GetAbsolutePath() couldn't handle prefixes other than '/' properly. |
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|
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@ Remove IsCorrectPath() checks for File Access Control functions. |
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|
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File Access Control functions accepted only pathnames that start |
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with '/' because these functions assumed pathnames returned by |
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GetAbsolutePath() always start with '/'. |
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However, I found a program that opens an unnamed pipe via |
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(probably) /proc/PID/fd/ directory. (You can see entries like |
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"pipe:[number]" if you run "ls -l /proc/*/fd/".) |
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Now, File Access Control functions have to accept pathnames |
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that don't start with '/'. So, I stopped checking IsCorrectPath(). |
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|
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Fix 2006/04/19 |
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|
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@ Fix handling of NULL nameidata in vfs_open(). |
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|
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In 2.6 kernels, NFS daemon and sys_mq_open() call |
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vfs_create() with NULL nameidata. In such cases, |
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CheckSingleWritePermission() must not be called. |
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|
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Version 1.1.1 2006/05/15 Functionality enhancement release. |
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|
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Fix 2006/05/16 |
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|
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@ Support program files aggregation. |
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|
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Until now, programs that have no fixed names and their |
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parent programs had to be run in a trusted domain |
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since it is impossible to use patterns for granting |
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execute permission and defining domains. |
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I introduced a mechanism to aggregate similar programs |
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using 'aggregator' directive. |
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Some examples: |
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|
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'aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp' |
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to run all temporary programs for logrotate as /tmp/logrotate.tmp |
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|
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'aggregator /usr/bin/tac /bin/cat' |
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to run /usr/bin/tac and /bin/cat as /bin/cat |
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|
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Fix 2006/05/18 |
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|
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@ Unlimit max count for audit log. |
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|
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I forgot to replace MAX_GRANT_LOG and MAX_REJECT_LOG with INT_MAX |
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so that administrators can give any size for audit logs at runtime. |
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|
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Fix 2006/05/22 |
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|
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@ Support individual domain ACL removal. |
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|
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Until now, to remove ACLs from a domain, administrator had to |
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once delete and recreate that domain, which wastes a lot of memory. |
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I introduced a mechanism to remove domain ACL without deleting and |
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recreating domains. |
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Administrator can delete domains or remove ACLs from domains |
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via /proc/ccs/policy/domain_policy . |
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/proc/ccs/policy/delete_domain and /proc/ccs/policy/update_domain |
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were removed. |
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|
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Fix 2006/05/30 |
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|
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@ Add missing spinlock in SAKURA_MayMount(). |
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|
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vfsmount_lock was missing. |
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|
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Version 1.1.2 2006/06/02 Functionality enhancement release. |
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|
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Fix 2006/06/13 |
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|
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@ Merge tomoyo_connect.c and tomoyo_bind.c into tomoyo_port.c |
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|
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I merged these files that have only difference CONNECT and BIND, |
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that are likely to be enabled both or neither. |
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|
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@ Add CONFIG_TOMOYO_AUDIT option. |
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|
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I made auditing functions as optional because some Linux boxes |
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may have not enough disk space to store audit logs. |
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|
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Fix 2006/06/15 |
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|
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@ Support use of symbolic links for program execution. |
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|
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Until now, domains for programs executed by dereferencing |
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symbolic links were defined using dereferenced pathnames. |
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This was inconvenient for some Linux boxes who use busybox but |
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can't keep hard links of busybox. |
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I introduced a mechanism to allow using pathnames of |
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symbolic links using 'alias' directive. |
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Some examples: |
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|
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'alias /sbin/busybox /bin/ls' to run /bin/ls |
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(which is a symbolic link to /sbin/busybox) as /bin/ls |
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if /bin/ls is executed. |
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|
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'alias /bin/bash /bin/sh' to run /bin/sh |
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(which is a symbolic link to /bin/bash) as /bin/sh |
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if /bin/sh is executed. |
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|
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Fix 2006/06/21 |
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|
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@ Use ccs_alloc() instead of kzalloc(). |
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|
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To detect memory leaks, |
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I added a wrapper for tracing kmalloc() and kfree(). |
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There is no way to detect memory leaks caused by ccs-*.txt . |
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|
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Version 1.1.3 2006/07/13 Functionality enhancement release. |
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|
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Fix 2006/07/14 |
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|
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@ Change behavior of pathname pattern matching. |
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|
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Until now, it was impossible to use patterns like "\*.txt" |
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because "\*" matched to more than 0 characters until next '/'. |
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Now, "\*" matches to more than 0 characters. |
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|
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Until now, it was impossible to use patterns like "\$00" |
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because "\$" matched to more than 1 digits until next |
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non digit character. |
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Now, "\$" matches to more than 1 digits. |
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|
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Also, new patterns "\x" "\X" "\a" "\A" "\@" are added. |
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|
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Fix 2006/07/21 |
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|
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@ Add CONFIG_TOMOYO_NETWORK option. |
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|
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Until now, only port numbers for TCP and UDP were controllable. |
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Now, the combination of IPv4/IPv6 address and port numbers |
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for TCP and UDP is controllable. |
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CONFIG_TOMOYO_NETWORKPORT became obsolete. |
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|
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Fix 2006/07/25 |
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|
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@ Change matching rule for CheckFileACL(). |
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|
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Until now, only first entry that matched to the requested pathname |
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was used for permission checking. For example, two entries |
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|
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"2 /tmp/file-\$.txt" |
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"4 /tmp/fil\?-0.txt" |
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|
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are given in this order and requested pathname is "/tmp/file-0.txt", |
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the "2 /tmp/file-\$.txt" is used. But if two entries |
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|
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"4 /tmp/fil\?-0.txt" |
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"2 /tmp/file-\$.txt" |
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|
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are given in this order, the "4 /tmp/fil\?-0.txt" is used. |
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This may potentially cause trouble because the result of |
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permission checks depends on the order of entries. |
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|
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Now, all entries that matched to the requested pathname |
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are used for permission checking so that the result of |
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permission checks doesn't depend on the order of entries. |
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|
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Fix 2006/07/27 |
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|
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@ Support RAW IPv4/IPv6 control. |
458 |
|
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Some programs such as 'ping' and 'traceroute' use raw IP socket. |
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Now, the combination of IPv4/IPv6 address and protocol numbers |
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for IP is controllable. |
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|
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Fix 2006/08/04 |
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|
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@ Add filename and argv[0] comparison check. |
466 |
|
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The domain transition was done based on filename passed to do_execve(), |
468 |
while the behavior was defined based on argv[0]. |
469 |
There is no problem if the filename is argv[0]-unaware application. |
470 |
But if argv[0]-aware, access control bypassing happens if the process |
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transits to trusted domain but behaves as different program. |
472 |
For example, when the administrator specifies domain for /bin/ls as |
473 |
trusted but both /bin/ls and /bin/cat are links to /sbin/busybox , |
474 |
a cracker can run /bin/cat in a trusted domain if the cracker |
475 |
succeeds to invoke do_execve() with filename = "/bin/ls" and |
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argv[0] = "/bin/cat". |
477 |
|
478 |
I introduced a keyword that permits the mismatch of |
479 |
basename of filename and argv[0]. |
480 |
|
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Fix 2006/08/10 |
482 |
|
483 |
@ Support ID based condition checks. |
484 |
|
485 |
It was impossible to use process id (uid and gid and so on) for |
486 |
checking individual domain ACL. |
487 |
|
488 |
Now it became possible to use process id for checking individual |
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domain ACL. For example, |
490 |
|
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"1 /bin/sh if task.euid!=0" |
492 |
|
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allows the domain to execute /bin/sh only when the process's euid |
494 |
is not 0, and |
495 |
|
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"6 /home/\*/\* if task.uid=path1.uid" |
497 |
|
498 |
allows the domain to read-write user's home directory |
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only when the file's owner matches to the process's uid. |
500 |
|
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Fix 2006/08/22 |
502 |
|
503 |
@ Fix ROUNDUP() in fs/realpath.c . |
504 |
|
505 |
Alignment using sizeof(int) may be inappropriate for 64bit environment. |
506 |
I changed to use the larger size of 'void *' and 'long' |
507 |
instead of 'int'. |
508 |
For environment where sizeof(int) = sizeof(long) = sizeof(void *), |
509 |
this change has no effect. |
510 |
|
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Version 1.2 2006/09/03 Functionality enhancement release. |
512 |
|
513 |
Fix 2006/09/30 |
514 |
|
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@ Fix CheckFilePerm() in fs/tomoyo_file.c . |
516 |
|
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The location to call path_release() was too early. |
518 |
|
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Fix 2006/10/02 |
520 |
|
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@ Support per-domain profile. |
522 |
|
523 |
It became possible to assign different profiles for different domains. |
524 |
This will help administrators using building up approach. |
525 |
|
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Fix 2006/10/05 |
527 |
|
528 |
@ Change parameters for CheckFilePerm(). |
529 |
|
530 |
I was re-resolving pathnames inside CheckFilePerm() even though |
531 |
the caller function already resolved them. |
532 |
So I changed to pass dentry and vfsmount instead of pathname, |
533 |
and removed changes made on 2006/09/30. |
534 |
|
535 |
Fix 2006/10/06 |
536 |
|
537 |
@ Support deny_rewrite and allow_rewrite permission. |
538 |
|
539 |
It became possible to make regular files append-only |
540 |
using "deny_rewrite" directive in exception policy and |
541 |
override it using "allow_rewrite" directive in domain policy. |
542 |
|
543 |
Regular files specified using "deny_rewrite" directive |
544 |
can't be open()ed with O_TRUNC or without O_APPEND, |
545 |
can't be truncate()ed or ftruncate()ed, |
546 |
can't be turned O_APPEND flag off using fcntl(F_SETFL) |
547 |
unless specified using "allow_rewrite" directive. |
548 |
|
549 |
Fix 2006/10/12 |
550 |
|
551 |
@ Enable configuration options by default for kernel config. |
552 |
|
553 |
CONFIG_SAKURA and CONFIG_TOMOYO are now 'y' by default |
554 |
and CONFIG_SYAORAN is now 'm' by default. |
555 |
|
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Fix 2006/10/13 |
557 |
|
558 |
@ Use external policy loader. |
559 |
|
560 |
Until now, policies are loaded when /sbin/init starts and |
561 |
initial control levels are switched using CCS= parameter. |
562 |
But since some boxes have to fixate kernel command line options |
563 |
at compilation time, I think it will become more flexible |
564 |
by running external policy loader using init= parameter so that |
565 |
initial control levels can be specified before /sbin/init starts. |
566 |
|
567 |
Call panic() if initial control levels are not specified. |
568 |
|
569 |
Fix 2006/10/16 |
570 |
|
571 |
@ Add missing parameter in FindNextDomain(). |
572 |
|
573 |
'struct file' was needed for allowing 'if path1.*' checks. |
574 |
|
575 |
Fix 2006/10/23 |
576 |
|
577 |
@ Print error messages in CheckFlags(). |
578 |
|
579 |
Some users seem to have troubles picking up all necessary |
580 |
entries for the configuration file of SYAORAN filesystem |
581 |
since makesyaoranconf can't pick up entries that are |
582 |
nonexistent at the time. |
583 |
I added error message so that users can find missing entries |
584 |
using dmesg. |
585 |
|
586 |
Fix 2006/10/24 |
587 |
|
588 |
@ Change /proc/ccs/info/self_domain . |
589 |
|
590 |
I changed /proc/ccs/info/self_domain to return |
591 |
the domain of open time rather than first read time. |
592 |
This modification makes shell's redirection usage |
593 |
more convenient since redirection opens file |
594 |
but doesn't read at the time. |
595 |
|
596 |
'cat < /proc/ccs/info/self_domain' will return |
597 |
the domain of shell, and |
598 |
'cat /proc/ccs/info/self_domain' will return |
599 |
the domain of cat . |
600 |
|
601 |
Fix 2006/11/06 |
602 |
|
603 |
@ Replace MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE with ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE. |
604 |
|
605 |
Since it was inconvenient that requests that are waiting for |
606 |
supervisor's decision are rejected automatically when |
607 |
MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE seconds has elapsed, I modified WriteAnswer() |
608 |
reset timeout counter whenever a supervisor's decision is written |
609 |
and I modified ccs-queryd write a dummy decision every seconds |
610 |
so that the requests won't be rejected automatically as long as |
611 |
ccs-queryd is running. |
612 |
This change made MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE's meaning boolean. |
613 |
So I fixated MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE to 10 seconds and removed |
614 |
MAX_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
615 |
To allow administrators selectively enable "delayed enforcing" |
616 |
mode, I added ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
617 |
The behavior of "delayed enforcing" mode is defined |
618 |
in the following order. |
619 |
|
620 |
(1) The requests are rejected immediately if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=0. |
621 |
(2) The requests are rejected immediately |
622 |
if nobody is opening /proc/ccs/policy/query interface. |
623 |
(3) The requests won't be rejected automatically |
624 |
if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=1 and ccs-queryd is running. |
625 |
(4) The requests will be rejected in 10 seconds |
626 |
if somebody other than ccs-queryd (such as less(1)) is |
627 |
opening /proc/ccs/policy/query interface, for |
628 |
such process doesn't write dummy decisions. |
629 |
|
630 |
Version 1.3 2006/11/11 First anniversary release. |
631 |
|
632 |
Fix 2006/11/13 |
633 |
|
634 |
@ Replace trust_domain with keep_domain. |
635 |
|
636 |
Since it was troublesome that there are two elements that can disable MAC |
637 |
(assigning a profile that doesn't enable MAC or registering domains |
638 |
with trust_domain directive), I removed trust_domain directive. |
639 |
Instead, I introduced keep_domain directive to not to transit domains |
640 |
unless a program registered with initializer directive is executed. |
641 |
This change has the following advantages. |
642 |
|
643 |
(1) Allows administrator use "enforce mode" for operations after login. |
644 |
Since it was difficult to know what commands and files are invoked |
645 |
and accessed in what sequences beforehand, we had to use trust_domain |
646 |
directive for such domain, allowing users invoke any commands and |
647 |
access any files in any sequence. |
648 |
But now, we can use keep_domain directive and assign a profile for |
649 |
"enforce mode" for such domain, forcing users invoke only allowed |
650 |
commands and access only allowed files in any sequence |
651 |
while these operations are kept under the control of "enforce mode". |
652 |
|
653 |
(2) Allows administrator determine easily whether the domain is |
654 |
under MAC or not because only the profile currently assigned to |
655 |
the domain determines it. |
656 |
|
657 |
(3) Saves total number of domains and memory. |
658 |
|
659 |
Fix 2006/11/22 |
660 |
|
661 |
@ Don't allow use of undefined profile. |
662 |
|
663 |
To avoid assigning undefined profile to domains by error, |
664 |
I added checks before assigning profiles to domains. |
665 |
Now, profiles have to be defined prior to assigning them to domains. |
666 |
|
667 |
Version 1.3.1 2006/12/08 Minor update release. |
668 |
|
669 |
Fix 2006/12/10 |
670 |
|
671 |
@ Allow pathname grouping. |
672 |
|
673 |
To reduce the labor of repeating '/\*' to allow access recursively, |
674 |
I introduced a macro 'path_group' to make group such pathnames. |
675 |
For example, you had to give like |
676 |
|
677 |
4 /var/www/html/\* |
678 |
4 /var/www/html/\*/\* |
679 |
4 /var/www/html/\*/\*/\* |
680 |
4 /var/www/html/\*/\*/\*/\* |
681 |
|
682 |
but now, you can give just |
683 |
|
684 |
4 @WEB-CONTENTS |
685 |
|
686 |
if you give |
687 |
|
688 |
path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\* |
689 |
path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\*/\* |
690 |
path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\*/\*/\* |
691 |
path_group WEB-CONTENTS /var/www/html/\*/\*/\*/\* |
692 |
|
693 |
in the exception policy. |
694 |
This macro will be useful when grouping different directories. |
695 |
|
696 |
Fix 2006/12/15 |
697 |
|
698 |
@ Use structured pathnames instead for simple 'char *'. |
699 |
|
700 |
To reduce the cost of strcmp(), I changed the return value of |
701 |
SaveName() from 'const char *' to 'const struct path_info *'. |
702 |
This change will speed up PathMatchesToPattern() comparison. |
703 |
|
704 |
Fix 2006/12/19 |
705 |
|
706 |
@ Allow registering policy managers using domainnames. |
707 |
|
708 |
It was difficult to restrict programs that can update policies |
709 |
via /proc/ccs/ interfaces using pathnames of these programs, for |
710 |
these programs could be unintendedly invoked. |
711 |
Now, it became possible to restrict domains that can update policies |
712 |
via /proc/ccs/ interfaces as well as programs. |
713 |
By restricting using domainnames, it becomes easier to avoid |
714 |
unintended invocation. |
715 |
|
716 |
Fix 2006/12/22 |
717 |
|
718 |
@ Add initialize_domain,no_initizlize_domain,no_keep_domain |
719 |
|
720 |
To control domain transitions more strictly, |
721 |
initialize_domain,no_initizlize_domain,no_keep_domain directives |
722 |
were introduced. |
723 |
|
724 |
"initialize_domain /some/program" means |
725 |
jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain if /some/program is |
726 |
called from any domain. |
727 |
This is equivalent to conventional "initializer /some/program". |
728 |
|
729 |
"initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" means |
730 |
jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain only if /some/program is |
731 |
called from "some_domain" domain. |
732 |
|
733 |
"no_initialize_domain /some/program" means |
734 |
don't jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain even if |
735 |
"initialize_domain /some/program" or |
736 |
"initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given |
737 |
if /some/program is called from any domain. |
738 |
|
739 |
"no_initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" means |
740 |
don't jump to "<kernel> /some/program" domain even if |
741 |
"initialize_domain /some/program" or |
742 |
"initialize_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given |
743 |
if /some/program is called from "some_domain" domain. |
744 |
|
745 |
"keep_domain some_domain" means don't jump to child domain |
746 |
if any programs are called from "some_domain" domain. |
747 |
|
748 |
"keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" means |
749 |
don't jump to child domain only if /some/program is |
750 |
called from "some_domain" domain. |
751 |
|
752 |
"no_keep_domain some_domain" means |
753 |
jump to child domain even if |
754 |
"keep_domain /some/program" or |
755 |
"keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given |
756 |
if any programs are called from "some_domain" domain. |
757 |
|
758 |
"no_keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" means |
759 |
jump to child domain even if |
760 |
"keep_domain /some/program" or |
761 |
"keep_domain /some/program from some_domain" are given |
762 |
if /some/program is called from "some_domain" domain. |
763 |
|
764 |
"some_domain" can be just the last component of domainname. |
765 |
For example, giving "/bin/mail" as "some_domain" matches to |
766 |
all domains whose domainname ends with "/bin/mail". |
767 |
|
768 |
Fix 2007/01/19 |
769 |
|
770 |
@ Allow reuse of memory allocated for domain policy. |
771 |
|
772 |
Regarding domain policy, unlike other policies, didn't have |
773 |
"is_deleted" flag and new memory were allocated |
774 |
if the deleted entries are given again. |
775 |
But to allow administrators switch domain policy periodically, |
776 |
I introduced "is_deleted" flag. |
777 |
|
778 |
Writing "some_domain" to /proc/ccs/policy/domain_policy |
779 |
creates "some_domain" using new memory if it didn't exist. |
780 |
|
781 |
Writing "select some_domain" doesn't create "some_domain" |
782 |
if it didn't exist. |
783 |
|
784 |
Writing "delete some_domain" deletes "some_domain" |
785 |
but does not delete entries in "some_domain". |
786 |
|
787 |
Writing "undelete some_domain" undeletes "some_domain" |
788 |
if it was deleted by "delete some_domain". |
789 |
|
790 |
Fix 2007/01/22 |
791 |
|
792 |
@ Allow getting already deleted pathnames. |
793 |
|
794 |
To allow getting pathnames that are already deleted, |
795 |
I removed (IS_ROOT(dentry) || !d_unhashed(dentry)) check. |
796 |
|
797 |
Fix 2007/01/26 |
798 |
|
799 |
@ Limit string length to 4000. |
800 |
|
801 |
I was using PAGE_SIZE (4096 in many environments) |
802 |
as the max length of any string data. |
803 |
But for environments that have larger PAGE_SIZE, |
804 |
doing memset(ptr, 0, PAGE_SIZE) everytime is too wasteful. |
805 |
|
806 |
Fix 2007/01/29 |
807 |
|
808 |
@ Add garbage collector for domain policy. |
809 |
|
810 |
Writing "some_domain" to /proc/ccs/policy/domain_policy |
811 |
creates "some_domain" using new memory only if |
812 |
some process is staying at that deleted domain. |
813 |
If no process is staying at that deleted domain, |
814 |
"some_domain" is undeleted with all ACLs deleted. |
815 |
|
816 |
Version 1.3.2 2007/02/14 Usability enhancement release. |
817 |
|
818 |
Fix 2007/02/20 |
819 |
|
820 |
@ Allow address grouping. |
821 |
|
822 |
To reduce the labor of repeating similar IPv4/IPv6 addresses, |
823 |
I introduced a macro 'address_group' to make group such addresses. |
824 |
For example, you had to give like |
825 |
|
826 |
allow_network TCP accept 10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255 1024-65535 |
827 |
allow_network TCP accept 172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255 1024-65535 |
828 |
allow_network TCP accept 192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255 1024-65535 |
829 |
|
830 |
but now, you can give just |
831 |
|
832 |
allow_network TCP accept @localnet 1024-65535 |
833 |
|
834 |
if you give |
835 |
|
836 |
address_group localnet 10.0.0.0-10.255.255.255 |
837 |
address_group localnet 172.16.0.0-172.31.255.255 |
838 |
address_group localnet 192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255 |
839 |
|
840 |
in the exception policy. |
841 |
|
842 |
Fix 2007/03/03 |
843 |
|
844 |
@ Remove obsolete functions. |
845 |
|
846 |
@ Add some hooks. |
847 |
|
848 |
Read permission check is done if open_exec() |
849 |
is called from search_binary_handler(). |
850 |
Read permission check is not done if open_exec() |
851 |
is called from do_execve(), instead, |
852 |
execute permission check is done at |
853 |
search_binary_handler_with_transition(). |
854 |
|
855 |
I moved the location of calling CheckCapabilityACL() |
856 |
and CheckMountPermission() from sys_mount() to do_mount(). |
857 |
|
858 |
Fix 2007/03/07 |
859 |
|
860 |
@ Use 'unsigned int' for sscanf(). |
861 |
|
862 |
I compiled SYAORAN fs on x86_64 environment and found |
863 |
the compiler showing warning messages about size of data types. |
864 |
Since size of data types may mismatch for sscanf(), |
865 |
I replaced some types with 'unsigned int'. |
866 |
|
867 |
Version 1.4 2007/04/01 x86_64 support release. |
868 |
|
869 |
Fix 2007/04/18 |
870 |
|
871 |
@ Change argv[0] checking rule. |
872 |
|
873 |
I was comparing the basename of symbolic link's pathname and argv[0]. |
874 |
Since execute permission check and domain transition are done |
875 |
based on realpath while argv[0] check is done based on the symlink's |
876 |
pathname and argv[0], this specification will allow attackers behave |
877 |
as /bin/cat in the domain of /bin/ls if "/bin/ls and /bin/cat are |
878 |
links to /sbin/busybox" and "the attacker is permitted to create |
879 |
a symlink named ~/cat that points to /bin/ls" and "the attacker is |
880 |
permitted to run /bin/ls". |
881 |
So, I changed to compare the basename of realpath and argv[0]. |
882 |
Also, I moved the location to compare before processing |
883 |
"aggregator" directive so that |
884 |
"aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp" |
885 |
won't cause the mismatch of the basename of realpath and argv[0]. |
886 |
|
887 |
If /bin/ls is a symlink to /sbin/busybox, then |
888 |
creating a symlink named ~/cat that points to /bin/ls and |
889 |
executing ~/cat won't work as expected because permission check and |
890 |
domain transition are done using /sbin/busybox (realpath of /bin/ls) |
891 |
and will be rejected since the administrator won't grant |
892 |
"1 /sbin/busybox". |
893 |
|
894 |
Fix 2007/05/07 |
895 |
|
896 |
@ Support pathname subtraction. |
897 |
|
898 |
There was no way to exclude specific pathnames when granting |
899 |
permissions using wildcards. |
900 |
There would be a need to exclude specific files and directories. |
901 |
I introduced "\-" as subtraction operator. |
902 |
|
903 |
"A\-B" means "A" other than "B". |
904 |
"A\-B\-C" means "A" other than "B" and "C". |
905 |
"A\-B\-C\-D" means "A" other than "B" and "C" and "D". |
906 |
|
907 |
"A", "B", "C", "D" may contain wildcards. |
908 |
|
909 |
An example usage is "/home/\*/\*\-.ssh/\*", which means |
910 |
"/home/\*/\*/\*" other than "/home/\*/.ssh/\*". |
911 |
|
912 |
"A" should contain wildcards because subtraction from constants |
913 |
(e.g. "/usr\-usr/" or "/usr\-home/") is meaningless. |
914 |
|
915 |
Don't try "A\-B\+C" because "\+" is not addition operator. |
916 |
|
917 |
Fix 2007/05/24 |
918 |
|
919 |
@ Fix autobind hook. |
920 |
|
921 |
The location to call SAKURA_MayAutobind() in net/ipv4/udp.c |
922 |
and net/ipv6/udp.c were wrong. |
923 |
|
924 |
Fix 2007/06/03 |
925 |
|
926 |
@ Add a space in MakeMountOptions(). |
927 |
|
928 |
I forgot to add a space after "atime" and "noatime". |
929 |
|
930 |
Version 1.4.1 2007/06/05 Minor update release. |
931 |
|
932 |
Fix 2007/07/04 |
933 |
|
934 |
@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
935 |
|
936 |
ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" are used |
937 |
because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
938 |
|
939 |
Fix 2007/07/10 |
940 |
|
941 |
@ Add compat_sys_stime() hook. |
942 |
|
943 |
Some of 64bit kernels support compat_sys_stime() |
944 |
but permission check was missing. |
945 |
|
946 |
Version 1.4.2 2007/07/13 Bug fix release. |
947 |
|
948 |
Fix 2007/08/06 |
949 |
|
950 |
@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
951 |
|
952 |
Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount options |
953 |
regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
954 |
I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
955 |
"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
956 |
|
957 |
@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
958 |
|
959 |
I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this feature. |
960 |
|
961 |
@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
962 |
|
963 |
Until now, users had to add init=/.init parameter to load policy |
964 |
before /sbin/init starts. |
965 |
I inserted call_usermodehelper() to call external policy loader when |
966 |
execve("/sbin/init") is requested and external policy loader exists. |
967 |
|
968 |
This change will remove init=/.init parameter from most environment, |
969 |
although call_usermodehelper() can't handle interactive operations. |
970 |
|
971 |
@ Move external policy loader from /.init to /sbin/ccs-init . |
972 |
|
973 |
Installing programs in / directory is not good for packaging. |
974 |
|
975 |
Fix 2007/08/13 |
976 |
|
977 |
@ Update external policy loader. |
978 |
|
979 |
It turned out that /sbin/ccs-init invoked via call_usermodehelper() |
980 |
can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
981 |
Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
982 |
call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
983 |
add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init starts. |
984 |
|
985 |
Fix 2007/08/14 |
986 |
|
987 |
@ Update recvmsg() hooks. |
988 |
|
989 |
Until now, it was impossible to apply network access control for |
990 |
incoming UDP and RAW packets if they are brought to userland using |
991 |
read() or recvmsg() with NULL address because address buffer is NULL. |
992 |
I moved hooks from sock_recvmsg() to skb_recv_datagram() so that |
993 |
network access control for incoming UDP and RAW packets always work. |
994 |
|
995 |
Fix 2007/08/16 |
996 |
|
997 |
@ Return appropriate error code for CheckMountPermission(). |
998 |
|
999 |
I was returning -EPERM if something is wrong with CheckMountPermission(). |
1000 |
But SELinux determines whether selinuxfs is supported by kernel |
1001 |
based on whether error code is -ENODEV or not. |
1002 |
So I stopped returning -EPERM unconditionally. |
1003 |
|
1004 |
Fix 2007/08/17 |
1005 |
|
1006 |
@ Remove initializer directive. |
1007 |
|
1008 |
Use "initialize_domain" instrad of "initializer". |
1009 |
|
1010 |
Fix 2007/08/21 |
1011 |
|
1012 |
@ Fix "allow_argv0 ... if if ..." bug. |
1013 |
|
1014 |
It was impossible to use a word "if" to the second argument of |
1015 |
allow_argv0 if condition part is used. |
1016 |
|
1017 |
Fix 2007/08/24 |
1018 |
|
1019 |
@ Move /proc/ccs/\*/\* to /proc/ccs/\* . |
1020 |
|
1021 |
Some pathnames for /proc/ccs/ interface were changed. |
1022 |
|
1023 |
Fix 2007/09/05 |
1024 |
|
1025 |
@ Drop MSG_PEEK'ed message before skb_free_datagram(). |
1026 |
|
1027 |
I need to remove head message from unwanted source |
1028 |
from socket's receive queue so that the caller can pick up |
1029 |
next message from wanted source with MSG_PEEK flags. |
1030 |
|
1031 |
Version 1.5.0 2007/09/20 Usability enhancement release. |
1032 |
|
1033 |
Fix 2007/09/27 |
1034 |
|
1035 |
@ Avoid eating memory after quota exceeded. |
1036 |
|
1037 |
Although ACL entries in a domain won't be added if the domain's quota |
1038 |
has exceeded, SaveName() in AddFileACL() is called anyway. |
1039 |
This caused unneeded memory consumption. |
1040 |
|
1041 |
Now, quota checking is done before getting domain_acl_lock lock. |
1042 |
This may exceed quota by one or two entries, but that won't matter. |
1043 |
|
1044 |
Fix 2007/10/16 |
1045 |
|
1046 |
@ Add environment variable check. |
1047 |
|
1048 |
There are environment variables that may cause dangerous behavior |
1049 |
like LD_\* . |
1050 |
So I introduced 'allow_env' directive that allows specified |
1051 |
environment variable inherited to next domain. |
1052 |
Unlike other permissions, this check is done at execve() time |
1053 |
using next domain's ACL information. |
1054 |
|
1055 |
To manage commonly inherited environments like PATH , |
1056 |
you can use 'allow_env' directive in exception policy |
1057 |
to globally grant specified environment variable. |
1058 |
|
1059 |
Fix 2007/11/05 |
1060 |
|
1061 |
@ Replace semaphore with mutex. |
1062 |
|
1063 |
I replaced semaphore with mutex. |
1064 |
|
1065 |
@ Add missing down() in AddReservedEntry(). |
1066 |
|
1067 |
Mutex debugging capability told me that I had forgotten to call down() |
1068 |
since TOMOYO version 1.3.2 . |
1069 |
This function is not called by learning mode, |
1070 |
so the semaphore's counter will not overflow for normal usage. |
1071 |
|
1072 |
Fix 2005/11/27 |
1073 |
|
1074 |
@ Fix ReadTable() truncation bug. |
1075 |
|
1076 |
"snprintf(str, size, format, ...) >= size" means truncated. |
1077 |
But I was checking for "snprintf(str, size, format, ...) > size". |
1078 |
As a result, some entries might be dumped without '\n'. |
1079 |
|
1080 |
@ Purge direct "->prev"/"->next" manipulation. |
1081 |
|
1082 |
All list manipulations use "struct list_head" or "struct list1_head". |
1083 |
"struct list1_head" doesn't have "->prev" member to save memory usage. |
1084 |
|
1085 |
Fix 2007/11/29 |
1086 |
|
1087 |
@ Add missing semaphore in GetEXE(). |
1088 |
|
1089 |
mm->mmap_sem was missing. |
1090 |
|
1091 |
Fix 2007/12/17 |
1092 |
|
1093 |
@ Remove unused EXPORT_SYMBOL(). |
1094 |
|
1095 |
Mark some functions static. |
1096 |
|
1097 |
Fix 2007/12/18 |
1098 |
|
1099 |
@ Fix AddMountACL() rejection bug. |
1100 |
|
1101 |
To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts |
1102 |
not only "both source and dest are directory" |
1103 |
but also "both source and dest are non-directory". |
1104 |
I was rejecting if dest is not a directory in AddMountACL(). |
1105 |
|
1106 |
@ Change log format. |
1107 |
|
1108 |
Profile number and mode is added in audit logs. |
1109 |
|
1110 |
Fix 2008/01/03 |
1111 |
|
1112 |
@ Change directive for file's read/write/execute permission. |
1113 |
|
1114 |
Directives for file's read/write/execute permissions were |
1115 |
4/2/1 respectively. But for easier understanding, they are now |
1116 |
replaced by read/write/execute (e.g. "allow_read" instead of "4"). |
1117 |
But for easier inputting, 4/2/1 are still accepted instead of |
1118 |
allow_read/allow_write/allow_execute respectively. |
1119 |
|
1120 |
@ Change internal data structure. |
1121 |
|
1122 |
Since I don't have more than 16 types of file permissions, |
1123 |
I combined them using bit-fields. |
1124 |
|
1125 |
Each entry had a field for conditional permission support. |
1126 |
But since this field is unlikely used, I separated the field from |
1127 |
common part. |
1128 |
|
1129 |
These changes will reduce memory used by policy. |
1130 |
|
1131 |
Fix 2008/01/15 |
1132 |
|
1133 |
@ Add ptrace() hook. |
1134 |
|
1135 |
To prevent attackers from controlling important processes using |
1136 |
ptrace(), I added a hook for ptrace(). |
1137 |
Most programs (except strace(1) and gdb(1)) won't use ptrace(2). |
1138 |
|
1139 |
@ Fix sleep condition check in CheckSocketRecvDatagramPermission(). |
1140 |
|
1141 |
It seems that correct method to use is in_atomic() |
1142 |
rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero |
1143 |
whenever scheduling is not allowed. |
1144 |
|
1145 |
Fix 2008/01/24 |
1146 |
|
1147 |
@ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user. |
1148 |
|
1149 |
Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface. |
1150 |
But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that |
1151 |
it won't require ssh login by root user when administrating |
1152 |
from remote host, I eased restrictions on this interface. |
1153 |
|
1154 |
(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0) || |
1155 |
(current->uid != 0 && current->uid == inode->i_uid) || |
1156 |
(current->gid != 0 && current->gid == inode->i_gid) |
1157 |
|
1158 |
The inode's uid and gid are set using chown/chgrp commands. |
1159 |
|
1160 |
Fix 2008/02/05 |
1161 |
|
1162 |
@ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_pid(). |
1163 |
|
1164 |
Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace. |
1165 |
To search PID given from userland, the kernel needs to use |
1166 |
find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_pid(). |
1167 |
|
1168 |
Fix 2008/02/14 |
1169 |
|
1170 |
@ Add execve() parameter checking. |
1171 |
|
1172 |
Until now, it was impossible to check argv[] and envp[] parameters |
1173 |
passed to execve(). |
1174 |
I expanded conditional permission syntax so that |
1175 |
{ argc, envc, argv[] , envp[] } parameters can be checked if needed. |
1176 |
This will allow administrator permit execution of /bin/sh only when |
1177 |
/bin/sh is invoked in the form of "/bin/sh -c" and environment variable |
1178 |
HOME is set by specifying |
1179 |
|
1180 |
allow_execute /bin/sh if exec.argv[1]="-c" exec.envp["HOME"]!=NULL |
1181 |
|
1182 |
in the policy. |
1183 |
This extension will make exploit codes difficult to start /bin/sh because |
1184 |
they unlikely set up environment variables and unlikely specify "-c" |
1185 |
option when invoking /bin/sh , whereas proper functions likely set up |
1186 |
environment variables and likely specify "-c" option. |