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revision 1006 by kumaneko, Tue Feb 26 08:37:13 2008 UTC revision 1010 by kumaneko, Fri Feb 29 14:11:41 2008 UTC
# Line 1203  Fix 2008/02/26 Line 1203  Fix 2008/02/26
1203        I made "(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0)" requirement optional.        I made "(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0)" requirement optional.
1204        If this requirement is disabled, only "conventional DAC permission        If this requirement is disabled, only "conventional DAC permission
1205        checks" and "/proc/ccs/manager checks" are used.        checks" and "/proc/ccs/manager checks" are used.
1206    
1207    Fix 2008/02/29
1208    
1209        @ Add sleep_on_violation feature.
1210    
1211          Some exploit codes (e.g. trans2open for Samba) continue running
1212          until it achieves the purpose of the exploit code (e.g. invoke /bin/sh).
1213    
1214          If such code is injected due to buffer overflow but the kernel
1215          rejects the request, it triggers infinite "Permission denied" loop.
1216          As a result, the CPU usage becomes 100% and gives bad effects to
1217          the rest of processes.
1218          This is a side effect of rejecting the request from the exploit code
1219          which wouldn't happen if the request from the exploit code was granted.
1220    
1221          To avoid such CPU consumption, I added a penalty that forcibly
1222          sleeps for specified period when a request is rejected.
1223    
1224          This penalty doesn't work if the exploit code does nothing but
1225          continue running, but I think most exploit code's purpose is
1226          to start some program rather than to slow down the target system.
1227    
1228        @ Add alt_exec feature.
1229    
1230          Since TOMOYO Linux's approach is "know all essential requests in advance
1231          and create policy that permits only them", you can regard anomalous
1232          requests as attacks (if you want to do so).
1233    
1234          Common MAC implementations merely reject requests that violate policy.
1235          But I added a special handler for execve() to TOMOYO Linux.
1236    
1237          This handler is triggered when a process requested to execute a program
1238          but the request was rejected by the policy.
1239          This handler executes a program specified by the administrator
1240          instead of a program requested by the process.
1241    
1242          Most attackers attempt to execute /bin/sh to start something malicious.
1243          Attackers execute an exploit code using buffer overflow vulnerability
1244          to steal control of a process. But this handler can get back control
1245          if an exploit code requests execve() that is not permitted by policy.
1246    
1247          By default, this handler does nothing (i.e. merely reject execve()
1248          request). You can specify any program to start what you want to do.
1249    
1250          You can redirect attackers to somewhere else (e.g. honeypot).
1251          This makes it possible to act your Linux box as an on-demand honeypot
1252          while keeping regular services for your usage.
1253    
1254          You can collect information of the attacker (e.g. IP address) and
1255          update firewall configuration.
1256    
1257          You can silently terminate a process who requested execve()
1258          that is not permitted by policy.

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